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Clarifying the First Amendment Right of Access to Criminal Trials: Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court'—Statutes in many states contain provisions
allowing a trial judge to close a courtroom to the public during all or part of a
criminal proceeding. 2 Faced with exclusion, members of the press have
challenged these statutes, asserting that the general public, including the press,
has a right to attend criminal trials. 3 In three recent cases, the United States
Supreme Court has considered whether public access to a criminal trial enjoys
constitutional protection. In Gannett v. DePasquale, 4 the Court determined that
the guarantee of a public trial contained in the sixth amendment protects only
criminal defendants, and confers no right upon the general public to attend a
pretrial hearing. 3 In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 6 the Court found that the
first amendment did afford an access right to criminal murder trials.' In the
most recent case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 8 the Supreme Court pur-
sued the course begun by Richmond and considered the parameters of this new
first amendment right. Globe struck down a state statute mandating closure of
certain types of criminal trials, finding a presumption of public access which in-
heres in all criminal trials. 9 This presumption of openness, the Globe Court
stated, may be overcome only where closure in a particular trial serves a com-
pelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to prevent unnecessary infringe-
102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
2 See, e.g., GA. CODE 81-1006 (1950 & Supp. 1982); MISS. CONST. art. 3, S 26 (1972);
N.Y. jun. LAW 5 4 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15-166 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. S
78-7-4 (1953).
3 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett v. De-
Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
Conflict between those seeking information about criminal trials and those concerned
with the efficacious working of the criminal trial process has arisen in other contexts as well. See
generally Hirst, Silence Orders—Preserving Political Expression by Defendants and their Lawyers, 6 HARV.
C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 595-608 (1971) (discussing restraints upon extra judicial statements by
counsel); Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press A ss'n: Benign Neglect to Af-
firmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393-410 (1977) (discussing attempts to limit pretrial
publicity); Reznek, Gannett v. DePasquale and Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia: Reopening Courtroom
Doors and Constitutional Windows, 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 101-28 (1980) (analyzing Supreme Court
treatment of questions involving access to government institutions); Schmidt & Schmidt, Some
Observations on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 59 DEN. L.J. 721-65
(1981-82) (considering closure of courtrooms to protect defendants from prejudicial publicity).
• 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
5 Id. at 379-80.
6 448 U.S. 555 , (1980).
Id. at 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (White, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Stevens,
J., concurring); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);• id. at 599 (Stewart, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
For a discussion of the Richmond decision and of litigation prior to Richmond in the area
of access to trials, see generally Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Sex Crime Trials, 22 B.C.
L. REV. 361-84 (1981).
102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
9 Id. at 2619.
809
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ment of first amendment rights." Thus, the Globe Court concluded, a state
may not by statute mandate closure of any part of a criminal trial."
The litigation in Globe arose in April of 1979, when Albert Aladjem went
on trial in Massachusetts Superior Court for the forced unnatural rape of three
minor girls." At hearings on preliminary motions in the case, the trial court
judge ordered that the courtroom be closed to the public."
Upon being excluded from the hearings on April 24, 1979, the Boston
Globe, a major metropolitan daily newspaper, filed a motion to intervene in
order to assert its right to attend." The judge denied the Globe's motion," and
ordered thecourtroom closed to the public and the press for the duration of the
trial." The trial court based the order on Massachusetts General Laws chapter
278, section 16A (hereinafter section 16A)," which provides that at the trial.of
a defendant charged with a sexual crime against a minor victim, the trial judge
"sh'all exclude the general public from the courtroom. ' " 8
 The trial judge con-
strued section 16A as mandating the exclusion of the public and the press from
the Aladjem trial," and he invoked closure over the defendant's objection. 20
The prosecutor, moreover, stated for the record that the order was issued "on
the court's own motion and not at the request of the Commonwealth. „2I
After denial of its motion opposing closure of the trial, the Globe im-
mediately sought injunctive relief from a single justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. 22 At a hearing before the justice the next day, the
prosecuting assistant district attorney, on behalf of the victims, waived
"whatever rights [the Commonwealth] may have to exclude the press." 23
30
 Id. at 2620.
” Id. at 2621 & n.20.
12
 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 848, 401 N.E.2d 360, 362
(1980), (citing Commonwealth v. Albert Aladjem, Norfolk Sup. Ct. No. 73102-9 (1979)).
Globe Newspaper, 379 Mass. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 362-63 ("The court caused a sign
marked 'closed' to be placed on the courtroom door, and court personnel turned away people
seeking entry").
' 4 Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 363. Globe also filed two other motions, one requesting
that the court revoke its closure order, the other requesting that the court hold hearings on all
future orders. Id.
13 Id. The trial court judge issued his order without benefit of a hearing and without
argument of counsel. Id.
16 Id.
" Section 16A reads, in pertinent part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon,
with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed ... the presiding
justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting only such per-
sons as may have a direct interest in the case.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, S 16A (Michie/Law Coop. 1980).
' 4 Id.
19 Globe, 379 Mass. at 849, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
" Id at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
21
 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. at 2616.
" Id.
23 Id.
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Nevertheless, the single justice denied relief to the Globe." While the Globe
appealed to the full Supreme Judicial Court, the criminal trial proceeded and
Aladjem was eventually acquitted."
Nine months after the rape trial's conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court
dismissed the Globe's appeal as moot." The court proceeded to consider the
issues raised by the newspaper, however, since the issues presented were
"significant and troublesome, and ... 'capable of repetition yet evading re-
view.' "27
Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the Globe attacked the exclusion on
two grounds. First, the newspaper argued, contrary to the interpretation of the
trial judge, that section 16A did not require closure of the Aladjem trial." In
the alternative, the Globe contended that mandatory closure violated the right
of the public to attend criminal trial's under the first and sixth amendments. 29
Believing that the issue could be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds, the
Supreme Judicial Court declined to address the constitutional questions. 30 The
Massachusetts court noted, moreover, that a case involving the similar issue of
public access to a criminal trial, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, was currently
pending before the United States Suprerrie Court. 3 '
Turning to the Globe's statutory argument, the court agreed that section
16A did not require closure of the entire criminal trial. 32 The statute, the court
ruled, was enacted to serve two purposes: "[first,] to encourage young victims
of sexual offenses to come forward. . . . [and second,] to preserve their ability
to testify by protecting them from undue psychological harm at trial." 33
Reading the statute in light of these purposes, the court determined that it re-
quired mandatory closure only during the testimony of the minor victim."
24 Id. The justice's reasons for denying Globe's petitions were stated orally and were
not reported. See Globe, 379 Mass. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
25 Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2616-17.
26 'Globe, 379 Mass. at 847-48, 401 N.E.2d at 362. The court apparently concluded that
since the trial court's closure order, the basis of Globe's challenge before the single justice, had
expired with the termination of the criminal trial, no live controversy remained. See id.
27 Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 362 (citing Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911)). The language of the Supreme Judicial Court appears to be inexact. The
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" standard is usually invoked to remove cases from the
mootness category, thereby permitting consideration of the merits. See Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 at 514-16. The Globe's appeal having been dismissed, the Mas-
sachusetts court's consideration of the issues appears more in the nature of an advisory opinion.
See Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2627-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 Globe, 379 Mass. at 849, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
29 Id. at 849-50, 401 NE.2d at 363. Globe also challenged the order under article 16 of
the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, which is similar to the first amend-
ment. Id. .The court did not reach the state constitutional issue because, in the court's view, the
issue had not been adequately argued in the plaintiff's brief. Id. at 854, 401 N.E.2d at 366.
" Id. at 854, 401 N.E.2d at 366.
" Id.
32 Id. at 861, 401 N.E.2d at 370.
" Id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
" Id. at 861, 401 N.E.2d at 370.
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Closure of the entire trial, the court ruled, was not required to satisfy section
16A. 35 The court concluded, however, that other portions of such trials could
be closed at the discretion of the trial judge. 36
The Globe appealed the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court to the
United States Supreme Court," pressing its first and sixth amendment
claims." The newspaper contended that section 16A, even as construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, was unconstitutional 99 To the extent that the statute
mandated closure without a hearing, the Globe argued, it impermissibly in-
fringed the constitutional right of the public .to attend a criminal trial." This
right of access, the Globe maintained, emanates from either the speech protec-
tions of the first amendment or the public trial right of the sixth amendment.'"
Before the Globe's appeal was heard, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Richmond. 42 In Richmond, a newspaper had challenged a Virginia
state court order excluding the public and press from a murder trial:" Acting
upon a request for closure by the defendant, the Virginia trial court had ap-
parently relied upon a state statute which granted a trial judge discretion to ex-
clude persons from a criminal trial." The Virginia Supreme Court denied an
appeal, and the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding insufficient
justification for closure.'" Although the Richmond decision contained seven
separate opinions, a majority of the Justices concluded that the first amend-
ment embraces a right in the general public to attend at least some criminal
trials, including murder trials." The Supreme Court did not, however, deter-
mine under what circumstances this access right could be defeated or
infringed. 47 ,Following its decision in Richmond, the Court vacated the Supreme
Judicial Court's judgment in Globe and remanded for further consideration."
On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its original decision,
deciding that Richmond did not require invalidation of section 16A as construed
35 Id.
'6 Id. at 864-65, 401 N.E.2d at 372. Such closure, stated the court, would be initiated
by the Commonwealth. Before entering the order, the judge must hold an expeditious hearing at
which any person to be excluded has -an opportunity to state his objections for the record. An ap-
propriate order would follow the findings of fact. Id. at 865, 401 N.E.2d at 372.
" Globe, 102 S. Ct. at 2617.
38 See Brief of Petitioner at 9, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613
(1982)(reprinted in 13 Law Reprints, Criminal Law Series (BNA) No. 22 (1982)).
39 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 38, at 9.
4° Id. at 24-25.
41 Id. at 12, 27.
42
 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
43 Id. at 560-62 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
+4 Richmond, 448 U.S. at 560 (plurality opinion).
4' Id. at 580-81 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
* 7 Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion); id. at 598 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 600 nn.3-5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
46
 Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
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in its original decision.'" While recognizing that Richmond established a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials, the court found that that right
rested upon "an unbroken tradition of openness" in criminal trials." The
Massachusetts court then identified "at least one notable exception" to this
tradition in cases involving sexual assaults upon minors or adults." This ex-
ception, the court noted, is particularly strong where the closed portion of a
trial involves the testimony of minor victims." Having distinguished Richmond,
the Supreme Judicial Court balanced the interest of the state in passing the
statute against the interest of the public in attending the trial." The statute, the
court concluded, furthered the "genuine state interests" identified in its
original decision." Those interests, the court reasoned, would be defeated if a
closure determination were made on a case-by-case basis. 55 Balancing these in-
terests against the temporary infringement of first amendment rights caused by
closing the trial during the testimony of minor victims, the court found the
scales tipped decisively in favor of the statute . 56
Following the Supreme Judicial Court's affirmation of its closure decision,
the Globe again appealed to the United States Supreme Court." The Court, in
a six to three decision, reversed the Massachusetts court and, in doing so,
struck down the mandatory closure statute." The Globe Court held that a
presumption of openness applies to every criminal trial," and that attempts to
close even a part of any particular trial must survive strict scrutiny."
Globe Newspaper re-affirms and expands upon the first amendment right of
access to criminal trials recognized by the Supreme Court in Richmond. In
Globe, a majority of the Court for the first time embraced the position that a
presumption of openness inheres in every Criminal tria1. 6 ' Moreover, the Globe
Court resolved the issue not considered by Richmond—the conditions under
which the access right may be infringed or defeated—by applying strict
scrutiny to the statute in question. 62 The decision in Globe Newspaper thus
clarifies and strengthens the first amendment right of access establised in Rich-
mond.
42 Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1493, 1507, 423 N.E.2d
773, 781.
" Id. at 1501, 423 N.E.2d at 778.
" Id.
52 Id. at 1503, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
53 Id. at 1503-04, 423 N.E.2d at 779-81.
" Id. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
" Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 1981 Mass Adv. Sh. 1493, 1503-04, 423
N.E.2d at 779-81.
36 Id. at 1507, 423 N.E.2d at 780-81.
" Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 594 (1981).
'6 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2622 (1982).
'9 Id. at 2619 & n.13.
6° Id. at 2620.
" Id. at 2619 & n.13.
62 Id. at 2620.
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This casenote will first present the reasoning of the various opinions in
Globe Newspaper. Next it will trace the first amendment right of access from its
origin in Richmond. By considering Supreme Court decisions in the areas of
press rights at criminal trials and restrictions on freedom of speech, the
casenote will then analyze the two questions left open by Richmond and ad-
dressed in Globe. First, the casenote will examine whether the presumption of
openness applies to all criminal trials and to all parts of all criminal trials. Sec-
ond, it will discuss what level of scrutiny is appropriate in evaluating attempted
restrictions upon the first amendment access right. The casenote submits that
the Globe case is a logical extension of the Richmond decision and rests solidly
upon first amendment jurispruduence involving the press, criminal trials and
the disclosure of sensitive information.
I. THE GLOBE DECISION
Writing for the five-member majority in Globe, Justice Brennan first de-
cided that the case presented was not moot." Although the closure order con-
tested by the Globe expired with the completion of the criminal trial, the ma-
jority reasoned that the underlying dispute was " 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review.' "64 The Court noted that previous cases involving the rights
of the press at criminal trials had not been rendered moot by the termination of
the particular trial to which access had been limited. 65
Having determined that the case was not moot, the majority then turned
to the merits of the Globe's first amendment challenge to section 16A. The
decision in Richmond, the Globe Court stated, firmly established for the first time
that the press and the public possess a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials. 66 While no one opinion carried a majority in Richmond, the Globe majori-
ty pointed out that seven Justices in Richmond located the right of access within
the first amendment. 67 The Globe majority also noted that Justice Powell, who
63 Id. at 2618. Justice Stevens dissented in Globe because he felt that the case was moot.
Id. at 2627-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens' opinion, after the original trial court
closure order expired by its own terms, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts materially
narrowed the statute—section 16A—on which the order was based. Id. at 2628. Although the
Massachusetts court upheld the narrowly construed statute in the abstract, the petitioner had
never been subject to an order under the new interpretation, and would never be subjected to
another closure order as broad as the one which prompted the suit. Id. The Court, in Justice
Stevens' view, was offering an advisory opinion by prematurely considering a constitutional
claim where no live controversy existed. Id.
64 Id. at 2618 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
The Court stated that, as publisher of a Boston newspaper, Globe would reasonably
be subject to another mandatory closure order based upon section 16A. Id. Since criminal trials
are usually of short duration, the Court reasoned that such an order would consistently evade
Supreme Court review if the termination of a trial mooted any challenge to the order. Id.
65
 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2618 (citing Richmond, 448 U.S. at 563; Gannett, 443 U.S. at
377-378; Nebraska Press Ass'n s. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976)).
66
 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2618.
67 Id.
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was not involved in the Richmond decision, had discussed the possibility of a
first amendment access right in the earlier case of Gannett u. DePasquale."
Although the right of access is not explicitly stated in the first amendment, the
majority reasoned that the first amendment is "broad enough to encompass
those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the
Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amend-
ment rights. "69 Free discussion of governmental affairs constitutes a core pur-
pose of the first amendment, the majority stated, and as recognized in Rich-
mond, public access to criminal trials helps ensure that such discussion is an in-
formed one."
Having established that the lack of an express provision for an access right
in the first amendment was not conclusive, the Globe majority noted that the
Court in Richmond had identified two reasons for affording a right of access to
criminal trials protection under the first amendment." First, Richmond had
found that criminal trials have historically been open to the press and the
public." This "presumption of openness," in the opinion of the Globe Court,
was significant both because "the Constitution carries the gloss of history,""
and because "a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
history." Second, the Globe Court re-affirmed the finding in Richmond that ac-
cess to criminal trials serves to further democratic self-government in two
respects. According to the Globe Court, public scrutiny acts as a check on the
judicial process, improving the quality of the court system," and public par-
ticipation "fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public re-
spect for the judicial process. " 76 These considerations led the Globe Court to
conclude that the first amendment encompasses as public right of access to
criminal trials."
While deciding that the right of access to criminal trials fell within the first
amendment, the Globe Court acknowledged that this right is not absolute."
The Court then considered the conditions under which the right can be
restricted. 79 Where the state attempts to restrict access to "inhibit the
disclosure of sensitive information," as in the instant case, the majority ruled
ment)).
ment)).
69 Id. at n.11.
69 Id. at 2619.
7° Id.
" Id. at 2619-20.
72 Id. at 2619.
73 Id. (quoting Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring,
 in the judg-
" Id. (quoting Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
" Id.
76 Id.
" Id. at 2618.
79 Id. at 2620.
79 Id.
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that the state's action must be subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 8° Limitations
upon this first amendment right, the majority decided, must further a compel-
ling state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest in order to be
upheld.'" According to the Globe Court, the same standard applies to all
criminal trials, regardless of whether the particular type of trial in ques-
tion—such as those involving sex crimes against minor victims—has been open
to the public historically."
Turning to the justifications for the statute offered by the Common-
wealth—protection of minor victims of sexual assualts from further trauma and
embarrassment, and encouraging those minor victims to come forward and
testify in a truthful and credible manner—the Globe Court found only protec-
tion of minor victims compelling." The majority dismissed the asserted in-
terest in encouraging testimony by minor victims as "speculative in empirical
terms" as well as "open to serious question as a matter of common sense. '84
The majority pointed out that while section 16A barred the press and general
public from the courtroom during the testimony of the minor victim, the press
still had access to the transcript, court personnel and any other source with
knowledge of the minor's testimony." To the extent that encouraging victims
depends upon guaranteeing the 'secrecy of the minor's identity, the Court
reasoned that the statute failed as an effective protection against publicity."
Moreover, the Court noted that minor victims of sex crimes are not the only
crime victims who are reluctant to testify for reasons of publicity." The state
interest, the Globe Court concluded, could therefore be used to support a host of
mandatory cIostire statutes, in derogation of the historical "presumption of
openness" inherent in all criminal trials. 88
The majority did agree that the second interest articulated by the Com-
monwealth, protection of the minor victim of a sex crime from further trauma
and embarrassment, was compelling." As promoted by the Massachusetts
statute, the Court decided, this compelling interest was not a general interest in
protecting the minor victim from all the trauma of testifying." The interest, the
Court stated, was limited to shielding the minor witness from the incremental
injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the press and the general
public." While that state interest was compelling, however, the majority found
80 Id. .& n.17.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2619 & n.13.
83 Id, at 2621-22.
84 Id. at 2622.
80 Id.
" Id.
a7
" Id.
81 Id at 2621.
" Id at 2621 & n.19.
Id
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that section 16A was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest." According to
the Globe Court, the significance of the state's interest may be affected by the
particular circumstances of each case." As a mandatory closure statute, the
Court noted, section 16A required closure during a minor's testimony even
where the victim did not desire the exclusion of the press and the general
public, and would not be harmed by their presence." Specifically, the record
below suggested to the Court that the minor victims would have testified
despite the presence of the press." In such a case, the Court concluded, the
compelling interest necessary to justify closure may not exist and, therefore, a
statute which mandates closure in all circumstances is riot justified. 96 The Globe
Court concluded that a case-by-case determination, in which the trial court
judge evaluates the significance of the interest in protecting the minor witness
in the particular case before him, would better protect the first amendment
rights of the press and the public from unnecessary restriction. 97
The majority did not establish precise guidelines for effectuating the case-
by-case determination, but did state that a meaningful hearing would include
an opportunity for the press and the public to present their arguments against
exclusion." The Globe Court also noted that the trial judge would be free to ex-
ercise discretion in structuring the hearing to prevent any frustration before the
trial itself of the compelling state interest in protecting a minor victim from
trauma." In addition, the majority enumerated a number of factors to be con-
sidered by the trial judge at an exclusion hearing in deciding whether to ex-
clude the press and the general public: the minor victim's age, his or her
psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the wishes
of the victim and the interests of parents and relatives.'"
The majority, in sum, identified a first amendment right of access to
criminal trials.'°' The Globe majority determined that before the press , and
public may be excluded from any part of a criminal trial, the trial court must
determine that closure in that particular case serves a compelling state interest
and is narrowly tailored to further that interest.' 62 While the state's interest in
Globe—protecting the minor victim of a sexual assault from the additional
trauma of public testimony—was compelling,'" the mandatory closure statute
failed, according to the Court, as a sufficiently narrow means to accomplish the
97 Id. at 2621-22.
93 Id. at 2621.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2621-22.
97 Id.
913 Id. at 2621, 2622, n.25.
99 Id. at 2622, n.25.
"°° Id. at 2621.
'°' Id. at 2618.
k 02 Id. at 2620.
106 Id. at 2621 & n.19.
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state's intent.'" The Globe Court concluded that a case-by-case consideration
would be necessary.'"
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment,'" agreeing that Richmond
established a first amendment right of access to criminal trials in the press and
in the general public.'" She disagreed, however, with the sweeping language
of the majority opinion, which stated that Richmond endorsed the proposition
that the first amendment protections encompass every right "necessary to the
enjoyment of other first amendment rights.' 1 °8 Justice O'Connor would limit
the Richmond and Globe decisions to their facts, the context of criminal trials.'"
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented."° In con-
cluding that the mandatory closure statute should be upheld over the Globe's
challenge, the Chief Justice argued that the majority had misinterpreted Rich-
mond." Chief Justice Burger, who had authored the plurality opinion in Rich-
mond, understood Richmond to provide a first amendment right of access only to
those criminal trials which have traditionally been open to the public." 2 Both
case law and long-standing state statutes, he reasoned, demonstrate that trials
involving sexual assaults, particularly against minors, do not share this "un-
broken, uncontradicted" history of openness." An examination of the
historical record indicated to him a clear practice of excluding the public from
sexual assault trials." 4 Thus, the Chief Justice would not apply the presump-
tion of access to criminal trials involving sex offenses against minors."s
The Chief Justice further objected to the standard of scrutiny which the
majority applied in Globe. "6 Assuming arguendo a first amendment access right
was implicated upon the facts presented, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with
the majority's assertion that section 16A in either purpose or effect inhibited
the flow of sensitive information.'" He reasoned, therefore, that strict scrutiny
was inappropriate.'" In his view, the appropriate analysis in Globe would
evaluate the reasonableness of the restrictions on access and balance the state
interests served against the "very limited incidental effects on the law of first
amendment rights."" 9
104 Id. at 2621.
105 Id.
156 Id. at 2621-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
'° 7 Id. at 2623.
t°6 Id. (quoting Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2619 (majority opinion)).
100 Id. at 2623.
"° Id. at 2623 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 2624.
'" Id.
1 " Id.
" 4 Id.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 2624-25.
'" Id. at 2625. The Chief Justice noted that the public had prompt post access to the trial
transcript of the victim's testimony, as well as to other sources of information about the minor
witness. Id.
" Id.
119 Id.
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In the case before him, the Chief Justice found the scales tipped decisively
in favor of the statute.' 2° He noted that the press and public had "prompt and
full access to all of the victm's testimony, ' "21 and a minimal additional interest
in being present during the testimony itself.'" The state, on the other hand,
the Chief Justice observed, had a number of strong interests in a mandatory
closure statute. 12 " The first, he indicated, protecting the minor victim from
psychological damage, even the majority had found compelling. ' 24 Moreover,
the Chief Justice saw the statute as a rational response to the under-reporting of
sex offenses. 128 Child victims and their families, he maintained, should be en-
titled to assurance that the minor will not be forced to recite the details of his or
her ordeal in front of television cameras or a crowd which includes "voyeuristic
strangers. "126
According to the Chief Justice, in order to protect these imporant state in-
terests, the state should be allowed to experiment.'" He argued that a state
possesses the authority to mandate closure in order to promote these important
interests effectively.' 28 The Massachusetts statute, in his view, was a rea-
sonable attempt to further these interests and was not unconstitutional. 129
Striking down the Massachusetts statute, the Chief Justice asserted,
created a distressing paradox: while states may, and do, provide extensive pro-
tections to minors charged with crimes, they may not close any part of a criminal
trial to protect a minor victimized by a crime. ' 3° He chastised the majority for its
"gross invasion of state authority and ... duty to protect its citizens," and for
what he perceived as a "cavalier rejection" of the interests supporting the
Massachusetts statute."
Chief Justice Burger, in sum, found the Massachusetts statute constitu-
tional. Agreeing with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he de-
clined to extend the presumption of access inherent in criminal trials to cases
involving sex crimes against minors. Believing section 16A to present only a
reasonable restriction on the public's first amendment rights, moreover, he
found the majority's strict scrutiny analysis inappropriate. In his view, a bal-
ancing test similar to those used in analyzing time, place and manner restric-
tions on the exercise of first amendment rights was sufficient.
II. CLARIFYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHT
The majority opinion and the Burger dissent in Globe differ on two central
02° Id. at 2625.
1 " Id.
'" Id.
'" Id. at 2625-27.
124 Id. at 2625.
1 " Id. at 2626.
126 Id
"7 Id.
"8 Id. at 2626-27.
129 Id.
"° Id. at 2623, 2627.
131 Id. at 2624.
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issues. First, the majority stated that a presumption of openness applies to
criminal trials generally,' 32 while the Burger dissent would limit that presump-
tion to those criminal trials which have been open historically.'" Second, the
majority ruled that upon the facts presented the statute mandating closure
must satisfy strict scrutiny analysis,'" while the Chief Justice argued for a
balancing test weighing the impact on first amendment rights against the in-
terests offered by the state to justify closure.'" Both the majority opinion and
Burger dissent invoke Richmond as support for their contrary propositions. The
next section of this casenote will examine the Richmond opinions in an effort to
trace the foundations of the first amendment right of access. This analysis will
then consider whether the majority opinion or the Burger dissent in Globe com-
ports more fully with Richmond.
A. The Emergence of a Right of Access: Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia
Two years before the Globe ruling, the Supreme Court decided Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia. 136 In that case, a murder defendant moved to exclude the
press and public from his trial, claiming a possible danger of prejudicing poten-
tial jurors.'" At a hearing to contest the closure order, counsel for a newspaper
covering the trial argued that constitutional considerations required the court
to determine whether any other less restrictive alternative means were
available for protecting the defendant's rights.'" The newspaper argued that
closure would be permissible only if the defendant's rights could be protected
in a manner no less restrictive than excluding the public and the press from
trial. The trial judge denied the newspaper's motion to vacate his closure
order, ruling that closure was appropriate if the defendant's rights were in-
fringed "in any way ... and [closure] doesn't completely override all rights of
everyone else.'" 39 The trial continued with the public and press excluded.' 46
The Virginia Supreme Court denied the newspaper's appeal from the closure
order,' 41 and the United States Supreme Court reversed.' 42
No one opinion commanded a majority of the Court in Richmond. ' 43 Each
"2 Id. at 2619 & n.13.
' 33 Id. at 2624 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
124
 Id. at 2620.
155 Id. at 2625 (Burger, C	 dissenting).
"6 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For a discussion of pre-Richmond decisions on access to trials, see
Note, supra note 7 at 375-82.
1" Id. at 559-60 (plurality opinion).
138 Id. at 560.
1'9
	
at 561.
"° Id. at 561-62.
34 ' Id. at 562.
112 Id. at 581.
'43 Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court and authored the plurali-
ty opinion, in which Justices White and Stevens joined. 448 U.S. 555 at 558-81 (plurality opin-
ion). Justice White and Justice Stevens also filed concurring opinions. Id. at 581-82 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshal],
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of the seven Justices voting for reversal, however, agreed that the first amend-
ment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, affords con-
stitutional protection for access to a criminal trial by the general public.'" The
Richmond Court established this right of access by first applying historical
analysis. Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger traced the origins of
the modern trial back to its roots before the Norman Conquest in England.'"
"From these early times," the Chief Justice observed, "one thing remained
constant: the public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was de-
cided.'"" This tradition, the Chief Justice noted, continued as well. in the
American colonies, and this "unbroken, uncontradicted history' " 47 con-
clusively demonstrated that "at the time when our organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively
open. "148 Justice Brennan, continuing in his concurrence the historical thread
begun by the. Chief Justice, found abundant support for public access to
criminal trials in the Court's own opinions concerning a defendant's right to a
public trial and the right of the press to print information obtained in judicial
proceedings.'"
Having discovered an historical tradition of openness in criminal trials,
the plurality and Justice Brennan considered the ways in which publicity fur-
thers the purposes of the trial process."° The public trial, according to these
Justices, helps assure a fair and accurate adjudication for the defendant."'
They also noted that it reduces the likelihood of perjury. 152 Publicity, according
to Justice Brennan, acts as well as a check on the judiciary.'" Furthermore, the
Justices stated, open courtrooms inspire confidence in the judicial system by
"satisfying the appearance of justice, "154 haVe a therapeutic effect on the corn-
and Justices Stewart and Blackmun, each filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Id. at
584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist
dissented. Id. , at 604-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell took no part in the case. Id. at
581
144 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (White, J., concurring); id. at 584
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 599
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Some of the Justices suggested that access protection may extend to civil as well as
criminal trials. Id. at 580 n.17 (plurality opinion); id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 586 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
145 Id. at 565 (plurality opinion).
' 45 Id. at 566.
147 Id. at 573.
'" Id. at 569.
149 Id. at 590-93 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
150 Id. at 569-73 (plurality opinion); id. at 593-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
151 Id. at 569 (plurality opinion); id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
'" Id. at 569 (plurality opinion).
153 Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
154 Id. at 571-72 (plurality opinion); id. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
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munity,"3
 and play an imporant role in educating the public. 136
 Finally,
Justice Brennan noted that judges under the American legal system are in some
respects lawmakers, with their decisiOns in particular cases having practical
consequences for society in general.'" In light of this impact of the trial on the
public generally, Justice Brennan concluded that public scrutiny of trials is
desirable to check possible judicial abuses and to promote accurate
factfinding. 156
While discerning a history of openness and a host of beneficial results from
open trials, a majority of the Justices in Richmond conceded that a right of ac-
cess to criminal trials lacks explicit constitutional support.' 39
 Nevertheless,
these Justices read the first amendment as extending "beyond protection of the
press and self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting
the stock of information from which members of the public may draw. ,,160
Public access to trials, the Justices determined, ensures informed discussion of
the aspect of government most important to the general public—the criminal
trial.'" Thus, the Justices concluded that the right of access falls within the first
amendment protections.' 62
The right of access emerging from the various opinions in Richmond was
that stated by the plurality opinion of the Chief Justice: "We are bound to con-
clude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of the criminal
trial under our system of justice.' " 63
 The first question presented in Globe
Newspapers was whether that "presumption of openness" applies to all criminal
trials or only to those criminal trials which have been open historically.
B. Clarification of the "Presumption of Openness"
The majority in Globe Newspaper reiterated the reasoning in Richmond in
"5 Id. at 570-72 ("Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante
the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the fun-
damental, natural yearning to see justice done—or even the urge for retribution.").
"6 Id. at 572 ("When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an oppor-
tunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular case.").
"' Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
'" Id. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
"9 Id. at 575 (plurality opinion); id. at 585, 588 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment). The Justices impliedly recognized the access right through discussion of the process of
deriving specific protections from the general language of constitutional provisions. Id. at 575
(plurality opinion); id. at 585, 588 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
"9 Id. at 575 (plurality opinion) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978)); id. at 587-88 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
16' Id. at 575 (plurality opinion) ("Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of
government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal
trials are conducted. . . .").
"2
 Id. at 575 (plurality opinion); id. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
"5 Id. at 573 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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finding a right of access to the rape trial involved.'" The rationale support-
ing Richmond led the Globe majority to conclude that the "presumption of open-
ness" applies at a macro level: all criminal trials, regardless of their individual
nature, begin with access to them presumed. h 65 Examination of the Richmond
opinions reveals that the Globe majority correctly construed Richmond as apply-
ing to all criminal trials. Although the Chief Justice authored the plurality
opinion in Richmond, 166 his argument that the "presumption of openness" an-
nounced in Richmond does not apply to sex crimes involving minors undersells
the broad language used by the Justices in that case.
While the Justices voting for reversal in Richmond announced their deci-
sion in six separate opinions, each considered the right of access question in
terms of criminal trials generally.'" Although Richmond concerned a murder
trial, none of the Justices mentioned the type of criminal trial involved as an
important consideration in finding a public right of access.'" None, in fact, so
much as mentioned the nature of the specific criminal proceeding involved in
analyzing the constitutional question.' 69 The access problem was considered
and decided by all of the Justices with respect to criminal trials generally.' 7°
Language employed by Chief Justice Burger in his plurality opinion
demonstrates that the Richmond plurality's approach drew no distinction be-
tween types of criminal proceedings. The Chief Justice framed the issue
presented in Richmond as whether the United States Constitution guarantees
the right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials.m The lesson of
history respecting criminal proceedings, wrote the Chief Justice, reveals that
criminal trials have always been open to all who wished to attend. 12 He con-
cluded that a presumption of openness inhered in the nature of an American
164 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2618, 2619-20.
366 Id. at 2619 n.13. See supra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
"6 Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 558-81 (plurality opinion).
t" See id. at 564-69, 573-78, 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 581-82 (White, J., concur-
ring); id. at 589-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 601, 604 (Blackmun J., concurring in the judgment). See also infra notes
168-76 and accompanying text (Public right of access discussed as applying to criminal trials
generally).
"a See supra note 143. 448 U.S 555 at 558 (plurality opinion); id. at 581 (White, J., con-
curring); id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 598 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment).
166 See supra note 167. Justice Stewart did state that "the trial judge appears to have
given no recognition to the right of representatives of the press and members of the public to be
present at the Virginia murder trial over which he was presiding. . . ." 448 U.S. at 600-01
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Nothing else in his opinion, however, suggests that the
type of criminal trial was in any way dispositive in the case. It at 598-601. In fact, several
Justices suggested that the access right extended to civil as well as criminal cases. See supra note
144.
176 See supra note 167.
171 Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 558 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
177 Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
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criminal trial."s Finally, the plurality ruled that absent an "overriding interest,
. . . the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. "174 The opinions of the
other Justices similarly refer to criminal trials generically."'
Had the Supreme Court intended to limit the right of access it established
in Richmond, one would have expected the various opinions to carry the con-
stitutional analysis a step further. After determining that a tradition of open-
ness inhered in criminal trials generally, the Justices logically would have ad-
dressed whether the particular type of criminal trial in the Richmond case—a
murder trial—shared in that tradition. The Richmond opinions, however,
universally omit this final step necessary to the conceptual framework the Chief
Justice purports to derive from that case.'" Richmond reversed the exclusion of
the public and the press because all criminal trials begin with a presumption of
openness, not just murder trials.
Chief Justice Burger, in his Globe dissent, argues that Richmond does not
preclude a determination that sex trials involving minors represent an excep-
tion to the criminal trial presumption of openness.'" He cites case law and
several statutes to demonstrate a "long history of exclusion of the public from
trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those against minors."'" The
authority employed by the Chief Justice, however, does not support the tradi-
tion of exclusion he discerns.
The Burger dissent presents six cases to support the proposition that the
tradition with respect to sex trials runs counter to that of criminal trials gen-
erally. "9 The six cases arose under the sixth amendment, with the defendant in
each case appealing his conviction on the theory that the trial court's exclusion
order denied him a public trial.' 80 In each case the trial judge had excluded the
general public from the trial of a defendant charged with a sexual assault upon
a minor female.'" In two of the cases, the courtroom was closed for the entire
trial;' 82
 in the other four it was closed only during the testimony of the minor
victim.'" In half of the cases the press was allowed to remain while the general
"3 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
"4 Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
175 See supra note 167.
16 See supra note 167.
'" Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"8 Id. at 2624. See infra notes 179 and 190.
"9 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), citing Harris v. Stephens, 361
F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488
(9th Cir. 1913); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437 (1935); State v. Pur-
vis, 157 Conn. 198 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648 (1921),
appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 702 (1922).
'" See supra note 179.
181 Harris, 361 F.2d at 891; Reagan, 202 F. at 488-89; Geist, 158 F. Supp. at 822-23;
Hogan, 191 Ark. at 438; Purvis, 157 Conn. at 206-07; Moore, 151 Ga. at 651-52.
nd Reagan, 202 F. at 489; Geise, 158 F. Supp. at 823.
183 Harris, 361 F.2d at 891; Hogan, 191 Ark. at 438; Purvis, 157 Conn. at 207; Moore, 151
Ga. at 652, 658-59.
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public was excluded.'" The important common denominator among the cases,
however, is that in each case closure apparently resulted from an exercise of the
trial judge's discretion.'" None of the cited authorities appears to involve a
mandatory statute requiring closure, as was the case in Globe.' 86
At best, the authority presented by the Chief Justice indicates that trials
may be closed more often in cases involving minor victims of sexual assaults. 187
As the Globe majority agrees that the right of access is not absolute,'" these ex-
amples of discretionary closure are consonant with a general tradition of open-
ness. Discretionary closure upon circumstances surrounding a particular trial,
in fact, implies that the presumption of openness still obtains.'" As stated in
one of the cases invoked by Chief Justice Burger—"Ordinarily the Sixth
Amendment] precludes the general exclusion of the public from the trial of a
case over the objection of the defendant, and limits the trial judge to the exclu-
sion of those persons or classes of persons whose particular exclusion is justified
by lack of space or for reasons particularly applicable to them. ,, 190
The statutes cited by the Chief Justice likewise do not support the proposi-
tion for which he offers them. All but two of the eight state laws cited are discre-
tionary, permitting but not requiring a trial judge to close the courtroom in sex
trials involving victims."' Discretionary closure statutes, like case law support-
ing discretionary closure, imply a general rule of openness even in those sexual
assault cases. The only two state statutes which reverse the presumption of
public access to a presumption of closure were both passed within the past six
years, 192 belying the claim that the statutes represent "long-standing provi-
18+ Geise, 158 F. Supp. at 823; Purvis, 157 Conn. at 207; Moore, 151 Ga. at 658-59.
185 See Harris, 361 F.2d at 890, 891; Reagan, 202 F. at 489-90; Geist, 158 F. Supp. at 824;
Hogan, 191 Ark. at 440; Purvis, 157 Conn. at 206-07; Moore, 151 Ga. at 651-59.
186 See cases cited supra at note 185.
' 87 See, e.g., Harris, 361 F.2d at 891 ("[T]he closing of the courtroom to spectators dur-
ing the testimony of the victim ... is a frequent and accepted practice when the lurid details of
such a crime must be related by a young lady.").
188 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2620.
189 Absent an affirmative exercise of judicial discretion, in other words, the trial would
remain open.
190 Geist, 158 F. Supp. at 824. Further, courtrooms have been closed in whole or in part
by judges exercising their discretion for reasons other than protecting minor victims of sexual
assault. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (prevention of disruption at
trial); Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975) (protection of undercover agents
while testifying). Under the Burger analysis, repeated closures for such reasons might also pre-
sent exceptions to the general presumption of openness. Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2623-24
(Burger, G.J., dissenting). Resorting to case authority evidencing closure in times past might
well defeat the presumption of openness in a host of trials.
191 The statutes permitting discretionary closure are: ALA. CONST. art. VI, S 169
(repealed; Amend. 328; 1973); GA. CODE ANN. S 81-1006 (1956; Supp. 1982); MISS. CONST.
Art. 3, 26; N.Y. Jun. LAW S 4 (McKinney, 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15-166 (1978); UTAH
CODE ANN. 5 78-7-4 (1953).
192 See FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 918.16 (West Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 632-A:8
(Supp. 1981),
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sions."'" One of these two statutes, moreover, specifically exempts the press
from an exclusionary order.'"
Chief Justice Burger, in short, appears to misread his own plurality opin-
ion in Richmond, which speaks to criminal trials generically.'" Moreover, his
observation that sex trials involving minors have been closed on occasion
reflects not an exception to the general rule of access, but a type of criminal
case in which the presumption may be more regularly overcome.
The Globe majority, on the other hand, reaffirms and clarifies the Richmond
presumption of openness by applying it to all criminal trials.' 96 Such an inter-
pretation seems more consonant with the language in Richmond, which speaks
of a tradition of access to criminal trials without limitation as to type.
The Globe majority and the Burger dissent also differ on the circumstances
under which the presumption of openness may be overcome. The next section-
will examine these competing theories in Globe and determine which best com-
ports with existing principles of first amendment jurisprudence and the policies
which underlie them.
C. Adoption of the Strict Scrutiny Test for Government
Infringement of the Access Right
While Richmond established that the public right of access to criminal
trials warrants constitutional protection, it left open the question of when that
right may be infringed by a judge or by statute. Several of the opinions in Rich-
mond, however, offered some general guidance. The plurality would require an
"overriding interest articulated in the findings. " 197 Justice Brennan suggested
that sufficiently powerful countervailing considerations would be required.'"
Several Justices agreed that reasonable time, place and manner restrictions
similar to those found in the first amendment areas of speech and assembly
would be permissible.' 99
 Justice Stewart specifically mentioned protection of
minor victims at a rape trial as a possible justification for restraining access. 2"
Having established that the presumption of openness applied in the case
before it, the Globe Court considered the proper test to apply in order to over-
ride the presumption.'" The majority agreed that reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions on access do not require a strict level of scrutiny."' Section
16A, however, the Globe Court found, imposed more than a reasonable time,
193 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
194 See FLA. STAT. ANN. S 918.16 (West Supp. 1982).
195 See supra notes 143-63, 171-76 and accompanying text.
199 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2619 & n.13.
1" Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 581 & n.18 (plurality opinion),
199 Id. at 598 & n.24 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
199 Id. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion); id. at 598 n.23 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
709 Id. at 600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
201 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2620.
292 Id. at 2620 n.17.
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place and manner restriction. 203 The mandatory closure statute, the Globe
Court stated, was designed to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information. 2"
In such a case, the Court held, strict scrutiny would apply."' The statute was
accordingly required to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state in-
terest. 206
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger maintained that strict scrutiny was in-
appropriate in the Globe case."' He argued that the situation in Globe was
substantially different from those cases in which state statutes thwarted the
dissemination of information or discussion of ideas.'" According to Chief
Justice Burger, because Globe had subsequent access to the trial transcript as
well as all other sources of information, the statute represented merely a rea-
sonable restriction on time, place and manner. 209 The proper analysis, he
stated, would balance the interests of the Commonwealth against the incidental
effects on first amendment rights. 210
Upon the facts presented in Globe, the Court could have ruled the statute a
reasonable time, place and manner restriction, as the Chief Justice advocated.
The information concerning the minor victim's testimony could be deemed
simply delayed and not denied. The public and press had complete post access
to the transcript, the witness herself and all other sources of information. 211 In
light of the narrow construction of the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, 212 moreover, the Globe would have access to all other portions
of such trials in the future. Such an interpretation of the Massachusetts statute,
however, would have represented a substantial departure from previous time,
place and manner restrictions and resulted in a severely restricted right of ac-
cess.
Time, place and manner restrictions upon the freedoms of speech and
association have been upheld where the restrictions are reasonable and only in-
cidentally burden first amendment rights. 213 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that legitimate state concerns of protecting the rights of all militate
against total freedom in expression and association. 214 Thus a city may require
a permit to use the public streets for a parade or demonstration, 215 or ban the
200 Id. at 2620.
204 Id.
205
206 Id
2" Id. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Zoe
209 Id.
210 Id.
2" Id.
212 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
215 Grayned v. City of Rockford,,408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1971); Adderly v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39, 47-48 & n.6-7 (1966); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941).
214 See Cox, 312 U.S. at 574; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949).
215 Cox, 312 U.S. at 575-76.
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use of sound trucks which emit loud and offensive noise among city thor-
oughfares, 216 or proscribe picketing in front of a courthouse. 217 Such regula-
tions do not deny exercise of first amendment rights, but exert some control
over their expression in deference to countervailing rights of others.
The analogous restrictions upon access envisioned by the various Rich-
mond opinions appear similarly designed to mesh exercise of the access right
with the other interests involved in a criminal trial. The Justices spoke of the
need to preserve decorum, 218 and of the physical limitations of the courtroom 219
as justifying reasonable restrictions. Previous Supreme Court decisions, in
fact, recognize the right of a trial court to exclude an unruly defendant from the
courtroom, 22° to limit the number of spectators, 221 and to restrict the use of
television cameras to ensure a fair and orderly trial. 222 These cases, as well as
the justifications for closure in the Richmond opinions, concern situations in
which, for reasons of decorum or courtroom space, "not every person who
wishes to attend can be accommodated." 223 In such cases, reasonable regula-
tion affecting the exercise of first amendment rights only incidentally is al-
lowed.
Where a state activity directly interferes with exercise of first amendment
rights, by contrast, the Supreme Court has invoked strict scrutiny. 224 Under
this test, the infringement of first amendment rights will be upheld only where
the restriction serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to pro-
mote that interest without unnecessarily trammeling first amendment rights. 225
Thus a state statute which prohibited a candidate from promising to lower his
salary if elected was deemed an unconstitutional restriction on the free ex-
change of ideas under strict scrutiny. 226
 Similarly, a state could not by statute
punish the publishing of truthful information obtained at trial where the state
interest in nondisclosure was not compelling and the statute did not cover other
media. 227
216 Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87-89.
217 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562, 564 (1965).
"a Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 598 n.23 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
216
	 at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion); id. at 600 & n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment).
226 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
221 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
222
 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965).
225
	 448 U.S. 555 at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion).
In such situations, the press is entitled to preferential seating. Id. at 581 n.18 (citing Gan-
nett, 443 U.S. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring)); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1978).
224
 Brown v. Hartlage, 102 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1979); NAACP v. Buttons, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). .
225 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 102 S. Ct. at 1529; Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at
101-02.
226
 Brown, 102 S. Ct. at 1532.
227 Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-05.
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Like the prior cases in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny, Globe
presents a case in which first amendment rights are directly infringed. The first
amendment right embraced by the Supreme Court in both Globe and Richmond
is the right to "see, hear and communicate observations" concerning criminal
trials. 229
 The Court has recognized that in most instances the general public
allows the press to exercise this right as its surrogate, thereby justifying pref-
erential treatment of the media when reasonable restrictions on access are
imposed. 229
 Neverthelesss, the right protected is direct access to the trial itself,
not subsequent access to secondary sources. 23° It is that access itself which en-
joys the historical support documented by the Court in Richmond. 23 ' When the
Richmond opinions describe the salutary effects of public access, they speak to
public viewing of the trial and not to post-trial review of a transcript. 232
 In Globe,
this public access is at one point completely terminated. 233
 Rather than deter-
mining which members of the public will be allowed to view the trial, the
Massachusetts statute in Globe revoked the right of access altogether. 234
 This
direct infringement warrants a higher level of justification than mere regulation
of spectator flow.
Availability of the trial transcript, as reccignizeci in Richmond, "is no
substitue for a public presence at the trial itself. . . [t]he 'cold' record is a
very imperfect reproduction of events which transpire in the courtroom.' ' 2" To
the extent that publicity serves as a check upon trial officials, the Richmond
plurality recognized, " [r]ecordation . . . would be found to operate rather as
[a] cloak than [a] check.' " 236
 A transcript does not describe the nonverbal
aspects of a proceeding, nor does it preserve statements not made to the record.
Even though the courtroom may be closed for only a small portion of the trial,
that portion may be highly important to the final determination. Particularly in
the case of a rape trial, it seems evident as a matter of logic that the testimony
of the minor victim is often the most important evidentiary matter in the case.
Suspending the public's first amendment right to view this portion of the trial
may well be necessari,,
 to protect the minor victim from additional trauma.
Complete albeit temporary infringement upon the access right, however,
should require stronger justification than is required to preserve decorum or
accommodate the seating limitations of a courtroom.
Chief Justice Burger would require only that the trial court balance in
226
	 448 U.S. 555 at 576; Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2618.
226
	 448 U.S. 555 at 577 n.12, 581 n.18 (plurality opinion).
290 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
233 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613. See supra notes 14-21, 32-36 and accompanying text.
23+ Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2616. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
2" Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 569 (plurality opinion); id: at 597 n.22 (Brennan, J., con-
curring in the judgment); citing in part I BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524
(1827).
256 448 U.S. at 569 (plurality opinion), citing 1 BENTHAM, supra note 235.
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each case the state interest in closing the courtroom against the need of the
press for instant access. 237 The need for instant access, however ;
 is the need to
exercise a right protected by the first amendment. Richmond and Globe protect
the public's right to be at the trial, not to read about it at some future date. The
balancing test advocated by the Chief Justice is simply inappropriate to the first
amendment right involved. 238
Globe, following the path cleared by Richmond, identifies the first amend-
ment right of access to protect access by the general public and the press to the
trial itself. When a criminal trial is completely closed, in whole or in part, to the
public and press, the infringement goes far beyond that of a reasonable limita-
tion on time, place and manner. As the Globe majority correctly ruled, absolute
closure for any portion of a criminal trial warrants compelling justification and
must be accomplished in the manner which infringes least upon first amend-
ment rights.
III. THE QUESTIONS REMAINING
As demonstrated above, Globe Newspapers clarifies the first amendment
right of access derived in Richmond. Although the case was argued by a press
organization, the right of access applies to the public generally and confers no
2"
 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
2" See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
Throughout his dissent, the Chief Justice argues that the result reached by the majority
presents a disturbing anomaly. 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2623-24, 2627. States are free to protect
minors charged with a crime, he maintains, while powerless in light of Globe to protect minor vic-
tims of sexual assaults. Id. While this argument possesses seductive appeal, it glosses over the
substantive differences in the two situations.
In Globe, the state interest implicated involved the protection of a minor victim of a sex-
ual assault. Id. at 2621 (majority opinion). That interest was found by the Globe Court to be com-
pelling. Id. The Globe Court ruled that a state may override the access right to protect that com-
pelling interest where its order or statute does not sweep too broadly. Id. at 2621-22. Although
minors accused of crimes have also been protected by state statutes, the Court has never viewed
the state's interest in sheltering minors accused of crimes from publicity as compelling. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Daily Mail .
 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979). Where protection of youthful offenders has
clashed with the first amendment right to publish information, the protective statute has been
struck down. Id. Protection of the minor victim thus stands as a more important state interest
than protection of the minor offender.
Court decisions which suggest that minor offenders obtain greater protection result from
the particular fact situations in which the cases arise. Challenges to orders protecting youthful of-
fenders usually arise in the context of juvenile proceedings, which the Court has consistently
viewed as qualitatively different from criminal trials of adults. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974). Juvenile proceedings lack the historical tradition of openness found in the criminal trial.
Id. As a result, the first amendment right of access does not factor into the Court's consideration.
Only where the press or public gains entry or otherwise obtains information which it then seeks to
disseminate is the first amendment implicated. Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-06. Minor
victims, on the other hand, generally testify at the criminal trials of adults, which both Globe and
Richmond determined possess a constitutional presumption of openness. Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at
2618; Richmond, 448 U.S. 555 at 580 (plurality Opinion). See supra notes 144-63 and accompany-
ing text, Thus the differences in the two proceedings, not any perverse ordering of the two state
interests in the mind of the Court, lead to any anomalous result Chief Justice Burger perceives.
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special privilege upon the press. The Globe decision, however, provides no clear
answer to questions of the validity of state statutes which permit exclusion of
the general public while guaranteeing access to the press. 239 These questions,
therefore, must be answered by the suggestion in Globe that exclusion of any
persons from a criminal trial must be justified by the particular facts of the in-
dividual case. For example, a state statute allowing the trial judge, upon a find-
ing that the presence of the public would harm the minor victim, to exclude the
general public but permit representatives of the press to attend, appears likely
to be upheld.
• Another substantial question remaining after Globe concerns the nature
and extensiveness of the individual hearing required. The important interests
involved on each side of the issue, as well as systemic concern for judicial
economy, render definition of such a hearing difficult. On the one hand, the in-
dividual hearing must be more than perfunctory. 24" A nominal consideration
would render the first amendment right a nullity and the strict scrutiny analysis
little more than an academic exercise. An extensive evidentiary hearing, on the
other hand, would consume valuable court time and resources, and delay the
defendant's trial. More important, testimony and cross examination of the
minor victim on the issue of the additional trauma probable from the presence
of the public at trial could itself create tension and trauma for the victim."'
Such a traumatic hearing would defeat the same compelling interest which
closure would seek to promote. 242 An additional and related question concerns
who could contest a closure order at the case-by-case hearings: Would the press
alone represent the interests of the general public, or would each individual
subject to exclusion be afforded the opportunity to present his or her case?
Although subsequent litigation will be required to resolve the essential
elements of a hearing, certain broad requirements may be identified. At the
very least, representatives of the spectating public should be heard in opposi-
tion to a motion for closure. As the access right belongs to the public generally,
it is perhaps sufficient for one advocate to present the arguments against
closure. The press, representing itself as well as the non-attending public,
could serve this function. Upon a motion for closure and the receipt of
arguments against, the trial judge should question the minor witness to deter-
mine whether closure would serve its asserted purpose—preventing additional
trauma from testifying in front of a large audience. This interrogation is
necessary to ensure that the minor's desire for closure is not motivated by con-
cerns other than the additional psychological pressure from relating her ex-
perience before a sizable group of strangers. 243 To reduce the tension caused by
219 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. S 918.16 (West Supp. 1982).
210 Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 at 2621, 2622 & n.25.
241 Id. at 2622 n.25.
242 Id.
243 In Globe, for example, the record suggests that the victims were most concerned that
publicity about the trial would reach their grandparents, who were apparently ignorant of the
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the hearing itself, the questioning could be conducted in camera, perhaps by the
judge alone upon questions submitted by the adverse parties on the closure
issue. 244 If the authenticity of the minor's relevant concerns is established to the
court's satisfaction, the judge should then consider alternatives to complete
closure. In some situations a limited audience, press pooling or closed-circuit
viewing arrangement may be sufficient and feasible. 245
 Finally, the trial judge's
decision, the basis thereof, as well as the arguments of counsel and questioning
of the witness, should be included in the trial record to allow for immediate and
considered appeal.'"
In any closure situation, a successful determination will depend in large
measure on a trial judge sensitive to the competing interests involved. The trial
begins with access presumed. The judge must discern when the minor victim's
legitimate concerns override that presumption, and determine when suspend-
ing the public's first amendment right will alone assuage those compelling con-
cerns.
CONCLUSION
Globe Newspaper clarifies and strengthens the first amendment right of ac-
cess to criminal trials first established in Richmond Newspapers. The Globe ma-
jority logically read Richmond as discerning a "presumption of openness" in all
criminal trials, and then extended to this nascent access right the strict scrutiny
analysis traditionally afforded first amendment protections. After Globe,
closure of any part of a criminal trial to the public must both further a compell-
ing state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The applica-
tion of strict scrutiny analysis to trial closures implies that the decision to in-
voke closure in any particular trial must be based on a consideration of the
specific facts of that trial. Statutes mandating closure in all trials of a particular
alleged incident. Id. at 2621 n.5. Such a concern does not fall within the compelling state interest
underlying the Massachusetts statute.
244 See, e.g., • Oneonta Star Div. v. Mogavero, 77 A.D.2d 376, 378-79, 434 N.Y.S.2d
781, 782-83 (1980) (quoting Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d
442, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 399 N.E.2d 518 (1979)) ("If, during the course of the argument [on
closure], it becomes necessary for counsel to introduce [evidence], the public disclosure of which
would create the very prejudice sought to be avoided ... this portion of the argument [may] be
continued in camera. . .").
245 See Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S.
Ct. 2613 (1982) (reprinted in 13 LAW REPRINTS, CRIMINAL LAW SERIES (BNA) No. 22 1981/82
Term 1982). See also Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1014-18 (1969) (discussing the use of one-way mirrors for the ex-
amination of minor victims).
Some states, by statute, permit the use of videotaping of the minor witness's examina-
tion in chambers as an alternative to a public appearance before the jury. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. S 12-2312 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 918.7 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. S
46-15-401 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 30-9-17 (1978).
2" See, e.g., Oneonta, 77 A.D.2d at 379, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 782-84 (quoting Leggett, 48
N.Y.2d 442, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 399 N.E.2d 518)("[A]ll proceedings on the motion, whether in
open court or in camera, should be recorded for appellate review.").
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type cannot stand. Whether these procedural guarantees constitute effective
safeguards to access or mere formalities to closure is the question awaiting
future litigation.
JAMES M. KENNEDY
